As a Christian, an economist,
and a public policy analyst, this was an interesting book for me to read and
review. In a word, this slender volume ably describes how categories of deviant
behavior have changed in recent decades.
Hendershott opens the book by
describing the “the death of deviance” within the sociology profession. The topic
had been one of their most important fields into the 1960s and a popular staple
in undergraduate curricula—as a set of provocative topics ranging from
addiction to serial murder. But under post-modern influences, sociologists
began to argue that deviance was defined by society’s dominant groups, largely
for the purpose of censuring other groups. Ironically, in essence, the
intelligentsia was claiming to use their
power to free previously ostracized people.
In any case, today, powerful
interest groups are clearly playing a dominant role in defining deviancies away—or
into existence. The implications of this change have ranged from the ascendance
of “political correctness” to the reformulation of cultural norms. As a result,
the modern understanding of deviance often parallels the contemporary use of
the term “tolerance”—i.e., in large part, those who hold to traditional norms
are believed to be deviant and, ironically, their views are no longer
tolerated. For example, homosexuality was almost universally considered
deviant, but is now rivaled in deviancy by “homophobia”—with the latter defined
in the contemporary terms of “tolerance”, where mere disapproval is cast as
hatred and fear.
How does society define “normal”—both
in the sense of “ordinary” (what people typically believe and how they typically
act) and in terms of the “norms” that society expects individuals to meet. Moreover, how and why do these definitions
change over time? Economists tend to focus on the material incentives associated
with responses to individual preferences and government institutions. But Hendershott
is covering a realm in which non-material incentives are important and are determined
in communal settings. Obviously, religion and beliefs about “absolute
standards” can play a key role here—but other factors are also important. Take
two examples. First, why did individuals behave morally in the 1950s? To what
extent was their behavior driven by Christianity or other internal beliefs about
morality rather than a reflexive conformity to social norms or a desire to avoid
the costs of social stigma? Second, to
what extent was the post-Saddam looting in Iraq due to the impact of Islam,
poverty, Saddam’s dictatorship, or the absence of law enforcement. To make a
more specific application: how much looting would there be in the average
American city if there were no police available?
After her introduction, Hendershott
turns to a variety of contemporary applications. Her first topic is the role of
medicine in defining deviance—in particular, by promoting disease over decision.
And beyond reducing personal culpability, what was previously considered “sin”
is now often viewed as benign. In a word, many formerly deviant behaviors are now
considered neutral and if the behavior is still considered unfortunate, it is
also viewed as largely out of the person’s control. (She spends most of this
chapter talking about various addictions, but one can also easily see this
within the debate about homosexuality.) Is it “biochemical determinism” or “free
will” with some inherent tendencies to behave in a certain manner? The former
has always seemed a strange position for one to advocate. Where is the dignity,
self-efficacy and empowerment of having absolutely no control—or at least, in making
that claim? In the Christian tradition, blame-shifting goes back as far as Adam
and Eve in the garden (Genesis 3:8-13). But it always seems like a high price
to pay for pity and an excuse. In any case, the evidence that people do change belies the claim of the
determinists.
Hendershott continues by
talking about the “normalization” and de-institutionalization of the mentally
ill. She notes that, by normalizing mental illness, the definition was prone to
expand. As a result, we find assault redefined as “rage”, temporary insanity copped
as a plea, and ADHD and Ritalin taking the place of character flaws in children
and parents. Today, more than six million children are defined as mentally ill,
with parents now even requesting the diagnosis. Noting that doctors wrote
nearly 100 million prescriptions for anti-depressants in 2001, she concludes soberly
that “the practice of medicalizing deviance has encouraged the dangerous
fantasy that life’s every passing imperfection can be clinically diagnosed and
alleviated, if not eliminated, by pharmacological intervention through
push-button remedies.”
Hendershott also discusses
sexual abuse by Catholic priests—and how it relates to pedophilia,
homosexuality, celibacy, and the sometimes contradictory agendas of the
tolerance-mongers. The media have been reluctant to identify most of these
incidents with homosexuality, instead focusing on pedophilia and trying to
connect the abuse to celibacy. Of course, celibacy (for priests and other
singles) is now largely viewed as deviant, having been replaced by a social
norm of promiscuity. At the same time, some within psychiatry have been seeking
to normalize pedophilia. (She cites an article the APA Psychology Bulletin and notes that in 1994, the DSM was revised
to say that pedophilia by itself was not sufficient to “be indicative of psychological
disorder”.)
One of the strengths of
Hendershott’s work is her use of contemporary cultural and political examples to
illustrate her points. She points to the influence of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest in de-stigmatizing mental illness.
She critiques A Beautiful Mind, but she
would have better served in complementing it, at least in contrast to As Good as It Gets. While the love and
long-suffering of John Nash’s wife are essential to his recovery, love and
“tolerance” are not portrayed as sufficient. Nash also emphasizes the
importance of his “diet of the mind”— abstaining from certain destructive thoughts.
In addition, Hendershott points to the late Senator Patrick Moynihan’s warning
about “defining deviancy down” in the early 1990s as the catalyst for the
popular reconsideration of deviancy
as a doctrine—focusing on illegitimate births, welfare dependency, sexual
promiscuity. She argues that the election of Rudolph Guiliani in New York City signaled a
recovery in traditional understandings of deviance. And she also discusses the
role of 9/11 in redefining and solidifying traditional moral judgments.
Finally, all of this begs
some separate but related questions. Which “deviant” behaviors should we allow people
the freedom to engage in? To the extent that we allow such freedoms, how does
society continue to indicate that the behavior is, in fact, deviant? I agree
with Hendershott that cultural change largely determines legal change. Drunk
driving, cigarettes, sexual harassment, and date rape have all been stigmatized
in recent years—and within more traditional moralities this is a good thing. In
the movies of the 1930s, drunkenness, adultery, and wife-beating were all
glorified—but over time, the culture has stigmatized them all. Although law may
serve some role, the long and slow but ultimately more successful approach is
to emphasize cultural change—one life, one family, one community at a time.
